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Abstract. Compromised social media accounts are legitimate user ac-
counts that have been hijacked by a malicious party and can cause various
kinds of damage, which makes the detection of these accounts crucial.
In this work we propose a novel general framework for discovering com-
promised accounts by utilizing statistical text analysis. The framework
is built on the observation that users will use language that is measur-
ably different from the language that an attacker would use, when the
account is compromised. We use the framework to develop specific algo-
rithms based on language modeling and use the similarity of language
models of users and attackers as features in a supervised learning setup
to identify compromised accounts. Evaluation results on a large Twitter
corpus of over 129 million tweets show promising results of the proposed
approach.
Keywords: Anomaly Detection · Text Mining · Social Networks.
1 Introduction
Account compromising has become a major issue for public entities and regular
users alike. In 2013, over a quarter million accounts on Twitter were compromised
[6]. Shockingly, the Times magazine reported that Russian hackers were able to
compromise a large number of Twitter accounts for the purpose of spreading
misinformation in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election [1]. Despite massive efforts
to contain account hacking, it is still an issue today [2,9,12]. These incidents
are prime examples of the severity of damage that an attacker can cause when
their messages are backed by the trust that users put into the entity, whose
account was compromised. For regular users a compromised account can be an
embarrassing experience, since often questionable posts are published with their
identity in social media. As a result, 21% of users that fall victim to an account
hack abandon the social media platform [13].
Compromised accounts are legitimate accounts that a malicious entity takes
control over, with the intention of gaining financial profit [13] or spreading mis-
information [3]. These accounts are especially interesting for attackers, as they
can exploit the trust network that the user has established [11]. Finding these
hijacked accounts is challenging, since they exhibit traits similar to regular ac-
counts [11]. Researchers found that the detection of an account takeover can take
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up to five days, with 60% of the takeovers lasting an entire day [13]. Further-
more, black list matching cannot be used in the compromised account detection
task. Only after analyzing the changes in the account’s behavior, patterns can
be identified that expose the account as being compromised. This task therefore
requires methodology that is specific to accounts that have been compromised.
In this work, we study the detection of compromised accounts using seman-
tic analysis of text and propose a novel general semantic analysis framework
based on the observation that a regular user’s textual output will differ from an
attacker’s textual output. As a specific implementation of the framework, for a
user account under consideration, we model the user’s and attacker’s language
as two smoothed multinomial probability distributions that are estimated using
the textual output of the user and attacker, respectively. We use a similarity
measure between probability distributions as indicators that an account is being
compromised. Even though we do not know the begin and end of an account
takeover, our method leverages the fact that the average difference for random
account begin and end dates will be higher for compromised accounts, compared
to benign accounts. Using features derived from the similarity measure, we train
a classifier that can reliably detect compromised accounts.
We further formalize this problem in a threat model and utilize this model to
simulate account takeovers in our dataset, to compare an implementation of the
proposed framework1 to other approaches. In our experiments we find that the
proposed method outperforms general text classification models and two state-
of-the-art approaches for compromised account detection. To show real-world
applicability, we find evidence that non-artificially compromised accounts can
be detected when the algorithm is trained on simulated data.
2 Related Work
It is common practice in compromised account detection to build profiles based
on user behaviour and look for anomalies within them. Egele at al. [3] learns
behavioral profiles of users and looks for statistical anomalies in features based
on temporal, source, text, topic, user, and URL information. Ruan et al. [11]
finds anomalies in the variance of a users’s click behavior. Viswanath et al. [16]
applies principal component analysis to a user’s Facebook likes to find abnormal
behavior. Vandam et al. [15] studies certain account characteristics, such as
number of hashtags or number of mentions in tweets, which are used as features
in a classification framework. Karimi et al. [5] uses Long Short-Term Memory
(LSTM) networks to capture the temporal dependencies within user accounts to
learn distinguishing temporal abnormalities.
When it comes to textual information, current methods either do not leverage
it at all [3,11] our the textual features are superficial. For instance, text is only
used to detect language changes (e.g., from English to French) [3] or topics are
derived plainly from hashtags [3,15]. It is also common to simply use bag-of-word
1 The code is available at: https://github.com/dom-s/comp-account-detect
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Fig. 1. A tweet stream divided according to begin (tbegin) and end (tend) of an attack. A
language model is learned for regular tweets (θUser) and compromised tweets (θAttack).
features [15] or document embeddings [5]. Thus, all methods fall short of a deeper
semantic analysis of the textual content. Our methods follow current approaches
on detecting anomalies within user profiles, however, we detect anomalies within
the semantics of text as we leverage statistical language representations.
3 Threat Model
The adversary’s goal is to inject textual output into a benign account, in order
to mask the output’s origin and leverage the user’s influence network. In our
setting, it is irrelevant how the adversary obtained access to the account. To
make our method as general as possible, we assume that no account details are
observed, meaning that we ignore the friendship network, profile details, etc.
To further cater to generality, we don’t make any assumptions about the text,
except that it was written by a different author. In the case of an attack, we
assume that at least one message is injected by the adversary and that at least
one benign message is observed. For all accounts we assume that they existed
for more than one day.
We define our threat model formally and frame it as a classification problem.
Let U be the set of all users u. Further, let mut be a message m from user u at
time t. Our goal is to find all compromised user accounts Ucomp ⊂ U . We turn the
compromised account detection task into a binary classification problem, where
the goal is to decide whether a user account is compromised or not. We therefore
learn a function comp(u), which returns 1 if u ∈ Ucomp and 0 otherwise.
4 Approach
4.1 General Framework
We now describe the proposed framework for identifying compromised accounts.
In accordance with our threat model, the framework is based on the assumption
that an adversary’s textual output will deviate from a regular user’s textual out-
put. To capture this discrepancy between language usage, we propose to divide
the tweet space of a user into two non-overlapping sets MUser and MAttack.
We randomly assign two timepoints: tstart signals the start of the attack and
tend signals its end. All m
u
t with t ∈ [tstart, tend] make up MAttack, whereas all
mut with t ∈ [t0, tstart − 1] ∪ t ∈ [tend + 1, t−1] make up MUser. We can mea-
sure the difference between MUser and MAttack using any similarity measure of
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Fig. 2. Overview of approach.
our choice. This procedure can be repeated multiple times for different values
of tstart and tend. t can be of different granularity, where the minimum is per-
message and the maximum can be chosen at will. The more often the procedure
is repeated for a certain user, the higher is the sampling rate, which makes for
better approximations of the true difference between MUser and MAttack. Thus,
this strategy provides a flexible trade-off between accuracy and efficiency. The
similarity measures can then be employed as features in the downstream task.
4.2 Instantiation with Language Modeling
We describe our practical instantiation of the framework using language mod-
eling and supervised learning. We create a classifier that distinguishes com-
promised from benign user accounts based on a feature set, derived from our
framework. We measure this as the difference between two word probability dis-
tributions of a user and an attacker. We select KL-divergence [7] as our method
of choice to compare the difference of probability distributions. We assume that
when a user writes a message she draws words from a probabilistic distribu-
tion that is significantly different from the distribution an attacker draws words
from. Let θUser and θAttack be two word probability distributions (i.e., language
models) for the user and attacker. We need to select two time points tstart and
tend that mark beginning and end of the attack (Figure 1). As described by
our framework, all messages mut that fall within the time interval [tstart, tend]
contribute to θAttack, whereas mut /∈ [tstart, tend] contribute to θUser.
Figure 2 presents an overview of our approach. For a particular user, we
sample her tweet stream for random tstart, tend pairs. As seen in the figure, the
algorithm can, for example, select t2 and t−3 as tstart and tend, respectively. Thus,
all tweets that fall between {[t0, t1], [t−2, t−1]} contribute to θUser. All tweets that
fall in [t2, t−3] contribute to θAttack. Then, the KL-divergence for these specific
θUser and θAttack contributes one sample for this user. This process is repeated
for different samples (e.g., we used 50 samples in our experiments), where each
time tstart and tend are selected at random, with constraint tstart < tend. Sample
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rates are selected empirically, depending on the best classification performance
on a development set. We select the maximum, minimum, mean and variance
of the sampled KL-divergence scores. These features are then combined in a
Support Vector Machine (SVM) model, which learns the optimal weighting for
each feature based on the training data. Naturally, other classifiers can also be
used, but exploration of different classifiers is out of the scope of this paper.
4.3 Language Modeling Details
We try to estimate the joint probability of P (w1, w2, w3, ..., wN ) for all words
w1, ..., wN in the text. According to the chain-rule, this is equivalent to com-
puting P (w1)P (w2|w1)P (w3|w1, w2)...P (wN |w1, ..., wN−1). Because of the com-
binational explosion of word sequences and the extensive amount of data needed
to estimate such a model, it is common to use n-gram language models. N-gram
language models are based on the Markov assumption that a word w1 only
depends on n previous words (P (wk|w1, ..., wk−1) ≈ P (wk|wk−n+1, ..., wk−1)).
The simplest and computationally least expensive case is the uni-gram. Here,
the Markov assumption is that a word wk is independent of any previous word,
i.e., P (wk|w1, ..., wk−1) ≈ P (wk). All P (wk) for k ∈ 1, 2, ..., N make up a lan-
guage model θ, which is a multinomial probability distribution, where words
in the document are events in the probability space. The parameters for the
language models θ are estimated using maximum-likelihood. Maximizing the
likelihood of the uni-gram language model is equivalent to counting the num-
ber of occurrences of wk and dividing by the total word count (P (wk) =
c(wk)
N ,
where c(wk) is the word count of wk). This distance between two probabil-
ity distributions can be estimated using Kullback-Leibler-divergence [7]. In the
discrete case, for two multinomial probability distributions P and Q the KL-
divergence is given as DKL(P,Q) =
∑
i P (i)log(
P (i)
Q(i) ). It can be observed that
DKL(P,Q) 6= DKL(Q,P ). However, it is common practice to still think of
DKL as a distance measure between two probability distributions [19]. An is-
sue with DKL is that the sum runs over i, which is the event space of P
and Q. Thus, it requires the event space to be equivalent for both distribu-
tions. In our case θ is a language model. Now, let v(θ) denote the vocab-
ulary set of θ. As a result of maximum-likelihood estimation, in most cases
v(θUser) 6= v(θAttack). Thus, we have to smooth the probability distributions
such that v(θUser) = v(θAttack), which is required in order to calculate DKL. To
achieve this, we define v(θ) := v(θUser)∪v(θAttack). Then, we set v(θUser) = v(θ)
and v(θAttack) = v(θ) and estimate θUser and θAttack using the Laplace estimate.
5 Experimental Design
This section discusses our for research questions: (I) how effective the proposed
language model based method is in detecting compromised accounts in a sim-
ulated environment; (II) how the proposed features compare to general text
classification features and how to combine them; (III) that our proposed model
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outperforms state-of-the-art methods and can further improve performance by
combining their feature spaces; (IV) how effective is our method on a real (non-
simulated) dataset by performing a qualitative, manual investigation.
5.1 Dataset
Previous methods on compromised account detection either do not publish their
datasets [3,15,16] or the original text data is not fully recoverable due to re-
strictions of the social media platform or the deletion of user data [5]. Therefore,
meaningful evaluation is especially challenging in our setting. To circumvent this
problem it has become common that account attacks are simulated [4,11,14]. In
similar fashion, we perform a simulation of account attacks, which allows us to
compare different methods quantitatively to study their effectiveness. Any bias
introduced by the simulation is unlikely to affect our conclusions as it is orthogo-
nal to the methods that we study and we argue that such an evaluation strategy
is adequate to perform a fair comparison of different methods.
For simulation, we leverage a large Twitter corpus from Yang and Leskovec
[18]. The dataset contains conntinous tweet streams of users. Relationships be-
tween users, etc. are unknown. Finding compromised accounts manually within
a dataset of 20 million users is clearly infeasible. Simulating account hijackings
enables us to (cheaply) create a gold standard while having full control over the
amount of accounts compromised and begin/end of account takeovers. For simu-
lation, we follow our threat model introduced in Section 3, where the adversary’s
goal is to inject messages into regular accounts. Since we make no assumptions
about the textual content, we decided to replace part of the consecutive tweet
stream of an account, with the same amount of consecutive tweets from another
random user account. Since our algorithm has no knowledge about the begin and
end of an attack, we choose these at random, meanwhile ensuring that only a
certain pre-defined fraction of the tweets is compromised. This allows us to test
the effectiveness of our method in different scenarios, where different percentages
of tweets are compromised within an account. To get meaningful estimates for
the language models θUser and θAttack, we select the 100,000 users with most
tweets in our data. According to our threat model, we retain users with more
than one day of coverage, resulting in 99,912 users and 129,442,760 tweets.
5.2 Quantitative Evaluation
Our quantitative evaluation aims to show the performance of the algorithm using
standard metrics for performance measure. We measure classification Accuracy;
Precision, Recall and F1-score for the class representing the predictions of com-
promised accounts (1-labels). In addition, we show effectiveness of our method
for different levels of difficulty. We experiment with various settings for the per-
centage of compromised tweets in compromised accounts with random begin and
end dates of account take over. More concretely, we select 50%, 25%, 10% and
5% of tweets to be compromised, each representing a more difficult scenario. As
these ratios would not be strictly separated in a real-world scenario, we further
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experiment with random (“RND”) ratios, drawn uniformly from [5%,50%]. In
our experiments the probability of an account being compromised is set to 0.5
to obtain a balanced dataset. Furthermore, we employ ten-fold cross validation.
5.3 Baselines
We choose to compare our proposed features, based on language modeling (LM ),
to general features that have been proposed for text classification (i.e., word-
based and Doc2Vec [8]) and task-specific features from two state-of-the-art meth-
ods in compromised account detection, namely COMPA [3] and VanDam [15].
We combine them in a Support Vector Machine (SVM) framework, which has
been shown to be an excellent predictor for text classification. However, our
approach is general and can be applied to any classifier.
SVM. We use SVM with linear kernels for all models. Features are standardized
by removing the mean and scaling to unit variance. Ten-fold cross validation
is performed for all models to ensure there is minimal bias in selecting the
training/testing split of the data. All posts of a single user are concatenated
as one document. The labels for each document were chosen according to our
problem definition in Section 3; 1 if an account is compromised and 0 otherwise.
Word-based Features. For word-based feature representation and feature se-
lection we follow the methodology of Wang et al. [17]. We choose count based
(COUNT ) and TF*IDF based (TF*IDF ) representations of words and exper-
iment with two supervised feature selection strategies, namely chi-square and
mutual information. For dictionary creation we keep 100,000 uni-grams, which
appear in no less than 20 and no more than 9991 (=10%) of documents, to
remove very rare and very common words.
Document-based features (Doc2Vec). We leverage the method proposed
in Le and Mikolov [8] to learn low-dimensional vector representations for doc-
uments. As recommended, we choose a vocabulary size of 2M tokens [10], 400-
dimensional document vectors and a window size of 5 [8]. We make use of the
document vectors as features in our SVM classification framework.
COMPA [3]. This method builds behavioral user profiles and detects compro-
mised accounts by finding statistical anomalies in the features. We implement
features that can be derived from our dataset: time (hour of day), message text
(language), message topic, links in messages and direct user interaction. This
method is used for stream processing; once a user profile is build, the method
checks a new message against the existing user profile. For each feature the mes-
sage will be assigned an anomaly score, which reflects how different this message
is from the previously observed user profile. Since our method classifies accounts
as a whole, we simulate this process for each message within an account (in
temporal order of the posting of the message). We then aggregate the anomaly
scores, per feature, as the mean of the scores of all the account’s messages.
VanDam [15]. This work investigated the distributional properties of different
features on compromised accounts and uses them in a classification framework.
We implement the following features from this method: hashtags, mentions,
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URLs, retweets and sentiment. The authors use these features to classify sin-
gle messages as compromised. In our setting, we aggregate each feature’s counts
over all messages within an account and use the mean of the counts as features.
5.4 Qualitative Evaluation
Our qualitative evaluation aims to show how well compromised accounts can be
detected in the original dataset. Therefore, we manually evaluate the accounts
that have the highest probability according to our classifier. Here, a major change
is that we only inject messages into the training dataset, whereas the testing set
is left untouched. We randomly select 70% of users for training and 30% of users
for testing, with 25% of tweets compromised. Since there is no ground truth
in the testing dataset, we define four specific metrics to evaluate whether an
account is considered compromised. If two or more of the following metrics are
met, an account is considered as being compromised: In certain time periods
the account (1) has a sharp topic change, (2) has a specific posting frequency
change, (3) has a specific language change (4) posts repeated tweets.
6 Experiment Results
6.1 Effectiveness on Simulated Data
In this subsection we show (I), effectiveness our language model based method
when detecting compromised accounts in a simulated environment, (II), com-
pare the performance to other methods and (III), show that improvements can
be made when combining the language model features with other approaches.
To evaluate research question (I), we perform an ablation study in Table 1,
which shows the performance of all features together and individually. In this
experiment 50% of the tweets of a compromised account are compromised. We
observe that we gain maximum performance over all metrics when all features
are utilized (see column “All”). The classifier reaches an accuracy of 0.80, high
precision (0.90) and Recall at 0.68. Both measures are combined in the F1-score,
which reaches 0.78. We would like to note that a precision of 0.90 can be sufficient
for many practical applications, where the system could alert users or platform
providers. When features are investigated individually, we find that the features
“Max” and “Variance” perform worst. The features “Min” and “Mean” perform
almost equally in isolation and much better than the other two. Surprisingly, the
minimum sample of the two probability distribution is such a strong signal. We
hypothesize that the minimum will be higher for compromised accounts when
the sample rate is small and most tstart and tend dates fall within the actual
range of the begin and end of an account attack.
We turn to research question (II) and investigate how our language model
based approach compares to other methods. Table 2 lists the results for our
approach (LM ) and Doc2Vec. Best performance is reached when 50% of tweets
are compromised, with accuracy at 0.80 and 0.71, respectively. When the number
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Table 1. Ablation study using different measures.
Measure All Max Min Mean Var.
Accuracy 0.80 0.59 0.76 0.75 0.48
F1 0.78 0.57 0.72 0.72 0.35
Precision 0.90 0.61 0.87 0.83 0.47
Recall 0.68 0.53 0.61 0.64 0.27
Table 2. LM and Doc2Vec features, with different percentages of compromised tweets.
LM Doc2Vec
% Accuracy F1 Precision Recall Accuracy F1 Precision Recall
50 0.80 0.78 0.90 0.68 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.71
25 0.75 0.71 0.82 0.63 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.69
10 0.65 0.62 0.69 0.56 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.63
5 0.59 0.56 0.60 0.52 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59
RND 0.74 0.70 0.81 0.61 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.68
of compromised tweets is reduced by half, the accuracy drops to 0.75 and 0.69.
When the amount of compromised tweets is set to 10% and 5%, accuracy further
reduces for both approaches. For random ratios, the performance is slightly lower
than for the fixed 25% ratio. It is expected that this performance falls somewhere
within the lower (5%) and upper (50%) bounds for performance. Summarizing,
we see that LM outperforms Doc2Vec on all measures, except Recall.
In Table 3 we compare LM to general text representations. It can be seen
that Doc2Vec performs better than the word based models. This might be due to
the fact that Doc2Vec is able to learn a better representation for each document,
compared to TF*IDF and COUNT . Doc2Vec outperforms the TF*IDF model
by up to 15 percentage points (≈27% relative improvement), if the amount of
compromised tweets reaches 50%. The performance improvement is less drastic
when only small amounts of tweets are compromised. We further find that LM
performs best, as it outperforms TF*IDF and Doc2Vec with 6 and 7 percentage
points when only 5 percent of tweets are compromised, respectively. The most
distinguishing performance is achieved when the amount of compromised tweets
reaches 50%. There, LM outperforms Doc2Vec with 9 percentage points (≈13%
relative improvement) and TF*IDF with 24 percentage points (≈43% relative
improvement). We argue that this is strong evidence for the superiority of the
LM approach compared to other text classification methods.
When combining features, we find that adding Doc2Vec features to LM re-
sults in the highest performance improvements, with up to 7 percentage points
over LM alone (column: “LM + Doc2Vec”). Adding TF*IDF to LM or Doc2Vec
does only have a negligible effect (columns: “LM + TF*IDF” and “Doc2Vec +
TF*IDF”). The same minimal improvements are observed when adding TF*IDF
to LM and Doc2Vec (column: “all”). Thus, we conclude that the proposed LM
features add meaningful signals to general text representations.
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Table 3. Accuracy for different features and their combinations. Our method (LM ) is
compared to general text representations.
% COUNT TF*IDF Doc2Vec Doc2Vec +
TF*IDF
LM LM +
TF*IDF
LM +
Doc2Vec
all
50 0.53 0.56 0.71 0.72 0.80 0.81 0.87 0.87
25 0.53 0.55 0.69 0.69 0.75 0.75 0.82 0.82
10 0.52 0.54 0.63 0.63 0.65 0.65 0.70 0.71
5 0.52 0.53 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.62 0.62
RND 0.53 0.55 0.68 0.68 0.74 0.74 0.80 0.80
Table 4. Comparison to features from related methods. The dataset has random per-
centages of tweets compromised (RND).
Model Accuracy F1 Precision Recall
COMPA [3] 0.62 0.60 0.64 0.56
VanDam [15] 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.45
LM 0.74 0.70 0.81 0.61
improvement LM over best baseline 19.4% 16.7% 26.6% 8.9%
LM + COMPA 0.75 0.73 0.81 0.66
LM + VanDam 0.74 0.71 0.82 0.62
LM + COMPA + VanDam 0.76 0.73 0.81 0.67
improvement over LM 2.7% 4.3% 1.2% 9.8%
LM + Doc2Vec + TF*IDF + COMPA + VanDam 0.81 0.79 0.85 0.75
improvement when adding standard features 6.6% 8.2% 4.9% 11.9%
6.2 Comparison with Existing Detection Methods
For answering research question (III), we show how our features outperform
state-of-the-art detection methods and that improvements can be made by com-
bining LM features with related methods. The baseline features here differ in
the way that they are specifically designed for compromised account detection,
whereas the previous features were general textual feature representations.
We compare all models in Table 4. The first three rows compare the the
compromised account detection features on their own. Our model outperforms
the strongest baseline (COMPA) over all metrics, with the highest gains made
in accuracy and precision, increasing 19.4% and 26.6%, respectively. The fifth
through seventh row show the combination of the LM features with the two
baselines alone and in combination. Here we find that our method can further
improve when the baseline features are added. We argue that our features are
orthogonal to existing work, as evidenced by the performance improvement due
to combination of the feature spaces. The second-to-last row shows the perfor-
mance, when all baseline features are combined with the LM model. This results
in the best performing model, with gains over all metrics.
6.3 Effectiveness on Real Data
The final question we answer qualitatively is (IV), how effective is our method on
non-simulated data. We sort 20 accounts with the highest probability of being
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Table 5. Statistics of manually evaluated accounts.
Category Count Status Count
News 5 Abandoned 7
Spam 4 Active 6
Re-tweet Bot 2 Deleted 4
Compromised 1 Protected 2
Regular 7 Suspended 1
Unknown 1
compromised into six categories, shown on the left in Table 5. We find that
most of these accounts belong to categories with high variation in language,
i.e., news, spam, re-tweet bot. One of the accounts is found to be compromised.
This result needs to be seen in perspective, since the classifier was trained on
simulated data. We would expect the percentage of compromised accounts to
be much higher, if training data with “real” labels are used. These results show
that our algorithm can also detect “unusual” accounts and users, thus potentially
enabling development of novel text mining algorithms for analyzing user behavior
on social media, which should be an interesting future research topic.
We further inspect the current state of each account on the right side of
Table 5. We find that most accounts are abandoned and one account was sus-
pended by Twitter. The account that was identified as compromised was set to
protected, which could be an indicator that this user had become more conscious
about tweets that were posted from her account and therefore decided to not
share her tweets publicly. While manually investigating the account’s tweets,
we find that after discussing general topics a near-duplicate message is posted
hundreds of times with only brief pauses between tweets. Different users were
addressed directly, which were most likely followers of the account. With this
scheme the attacker tries to directly grab the attention of a targeted user. The
messages included one of two links that were identified as suspicious by the link-
shortening service the hacker utilized to hide the actual URL. After the attack,
the tweets return to discuss similar topics as before. From the content of this
messages we conclude that the hacker was pursuing a led generation scheme [13],
where users are lured into clicking a link. It is reasonable to assume that if our
algorithm were applied at much larger scale to all the Twitter users, it would
most likely be able to detect many more compromised accounts.
7 Conclusion
We proposed a novel general framework based on semantic text analysis for
detecting compromised social media accounts. Following the framework, we pro-
posed a specific instantiation based on uni-gram language models and KL-
divergence measure, and designed features accordingly for use in a classifier
that can distinguish compromised from benign accounts. We conclude that (1)
the proposed LM feature is most effective, even when used as a single feature-
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based detection method, outperforming all baseline methods. (2) LM captures
new signals that haven’t been captured in the existing methods and features,
which is shown by the further improvement when added on top of the baselines.
(3) The best performing method would combine the proposed LM with all the
existing features. Although LM is motivated by a security problem, our general
idea of performing differential semantic analysis of text data may be applicable
to other domains where incohesion (or outlier) in text data needs to be captured.
Further exploration of such potential directions is interesting future work.
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